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146 PEOPLE v. LEBEAu [39 C.2d 
The judgment is modified by striking out paragraph 0(9) 
thereof, and as so modified, is affirmed. Respondents to 
recover costs on appeal. 
Shenk, J., Traynor, J., and Spence, J., concurred. 
Schauer, J., concurred in the judgment. 
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied July 17, 
1952. 
[Crim. No. 5275. In Bank. June 20, 1952.] 
THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. VERNON LEBEAU, 
Appellant. 
[1] Criminal Law-Evidence-Rebuttal Evidence.-Where defend-
ant in a narcotics case testified that he "wouldn't know nar-
cotics" and had had no contact with them, testimony of a 
woman acquaintance indicating that he had som~ knowledge 
of cocaine is admissible and does not tend to show the com-
mission of another offense. 
[2] Witnesses-Impeachment-Impeaching One's Own Witness.-
A party may impeach his own witness by the use of prior 
inconsistent statements where he has been surprised and 
damaged by the witness' testimony. (See Code Civ. Proc., 
§§ 2049, 2052.) 
[3] !d.-Impeachment-Impeaching One's Own Witness.-Where 
woman, placed on witness stand by prosecution for purpose 
of rebutting defendant's testimony that he did not tell her 
that he used cocaine, denied that he ever told her that he used 
such drug, and such denial was likely to make it appear to 
the jury that the district attorney was harassing defendant by 
asking him whether he had made such a statement to the 
woman, the prosecution is entitled to correct this damaging 
impression by cross-examining its own witness and by im-
peaching her with proof of her prior inconsistent statements. 
[1] See Cal.Jur., Criminal Law, § 304; Am.Jur., Evidence, § 277. 
[2] Right of party surprised by unfavorable testimony of own 
witness to ask him concerning previous inconsistent statements, 
note, 74 A.L.R. 1042. See, also, Cal.Jur., Witnesses, § 146; Am. 
Jur., Witnesses, § 798. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Criminal Law, § 287; [2, 3] Wit-
nesses,§ 275(4). 
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APPEAL from 3: judgment of the Superior Court of Ala-
meda County and from an order denying a new trial. Charles 
Wade Snook, Judge. Affirmed. 
Prosecution for illegal possession of narcotics. Judgment 
of conviction affirmed. 
Thomas L. Berkley, ,Joseph G. Kennedy, Clinton Wayne 
White and Charles E. Wilson for Appellant. 
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, Clarence A. Linn, 
Assistant Attorney General, ,J. Frank Coakley, District Attor-
ney (Alameda) , and Vern on L. Goodin, Deputy District 
Attorney, for Respondent. 
GIBSON, C. J.-Vernon LeBeau was convicted of possess-
ing narcotics in violation of section 11500 of the Health and 
Safety Code, and he appeals from the judgment and an order 
denying his motion for a new trial. Defendant does not con-
tend that the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict, 
but he claims that the court erred in admitting evidence and 
in permitting the prosecution to impeach its own witness. 
A police officer testified that he searched defendant's room 
and discovered two capsules of cocaine in the pocket of a 
jacket which defendant admitted was his. LeBeau took the 
stand in his own defense and testified on direct examination 
that he had not seen the capsules before the officer discov-
ered them, that he never had narcotics in his possession, 
"wouldn't know narcotics," and had "never been in contact 
with any of them.'' On cross-examination defendant was asked 
without objection if he had not been using narcotics for many 
years prior to his arrest, and he answered that he had not. 
He was then questioned as follows: '' Q. You are acquainted 
with Nancy Teeples, known as Nancy McDowell? A. I know 
Nancy. Q. Do you know who I am referring to? A. Yes, I 
do. Q. Isn't it a fact that on several occasions you have 
told her that you used cocaine? A. No, I never told anybody 
I used cocaine." The prosecution called Nancy McDowell in 
rebuttal and asked if defendant had not told her that he used 
cocaine. She replied, "No." She was asked if she did not 
recall making a statement in the district attorney's office 
that LeBeau had told her on several occasions that he used 
cocaine. Mrs. McDowell replied ''I don't believe that I stated 
anything that definite. I may have stated that from conver-
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sations that I have witnessed that the defendant talked about 
cocaine. Whether he used it, I would not know, and I have 
already told you that.'' She testified later that she had heard 
defendant ''talking about cocaine.'' 
The prosecution claimed surprise and called a police in-
spector who testified that Mrs. McDowell, when questioned in 
the district attorney's office before the trial, had said that de-
fendant had told her that he used the drug. Mrs. McDowell 
was recalled by the prosecution, and, over defendant's objec-
tion, she testified that she remembered making a statement 
in the district attorney's office, but that she had not used the 
words attributed to her by the inspector. 
[1] There is no merit in defendant's contention that the 
court erred in admitting the testimony of Mrs. McDowell be-
cause it was immaterial and tended to show commission of 
another offense. Defendant testified on direct examination 
that he "wouldn't know narcotics" and had had no contact 
with them. Mrs. McDowell's testimony indicated that he had 
some knowledg·e of cocaine. It did not, however, tend to show 
the commission of another offense. 
Defendant also contends that the court erred in permitting 
the prosecution to impeach Mrs. McDowell. [2] It is well 
settled that a party may impeach his own witness by the use of 
prior inconsistent statements where he has been surprised 
and damaged by the witness' testimony. (See Code Civ. Proc., 
§§ 2049, 2052; Rystinki v. Central Calif. T. Co., 175 Cal. 336, 
342 [165 P. 952]; cf. People v. Newson, 37 Cal.2d 34, 41 [230 
P.2d 618] ; People v. Sliscovich, 193 Cal. 544, 553-554 [226 P. 
611].) No question is raised on this appeal as to surprise, and 
the sole problem to be determined is whether Mrs. McDowell's 
testimony prejudiced the People's case and warranted her 
impeachment. 
In support of his claim that Mrs. McDowell's testimony was 
not damaging, defendant relies on People v. Newson, 37 Cal. 
2d 34 [230 P.2d 618]. In that case defendant was charged with 
murder and a witness for the prosecution was asked on direct 
examination if at the time of the crime she had seen anyone 
in a building where the killing had occurred. She replied 
"No, I didn't." Over objection, the district attorney was 
permitted to impeach the witness by proving her prior extra-
judicial statements that she had seen defendant in the build-
ing at that time. The admission of her prior inconsistent 
statements was held to be error on the ground that her testi-
mony ''was purely of a negative character . . . neither favor-
June 1952] PEOPLE v. LEBEAU 
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able to one side nor the other,'' and was in no way damaging 
to the prosecution's case. ( 37 Cal.2d at p. 44.) 
The Newson case did not, of course, purport to lay down 
a rule that all negative answers are harmless, and it is neces-
sary to determine on the facts of each case whether the testi-
mony of the witness sought to be impeached has actually dam-
aged the party calling him. [3] Here we are satisfied that 
the witness' answer was more than a harmless refusal to tes-
tify as expected and that it prejudiced the People's case. 
Mrs. McDowell was placed on the stand by the prosecution for 
the purpose of impeaching defendant's credibility and rebut-
ting his testimony that he did not use narcotics. Her denial 
that defendant had ever told her that he used cocaine was 
likely to make it appear to the jury that the district attorney 
was harassing defendant and attempting to discredit him 
without any basis in fact by asking him on cross-examination 
if he had not told Mrs. McDowell that he used the drug. This 
impression might well have been aggravated in the jurors' 
minds by the fact that the subject of defendant's use of nar-
cotics was brought into the case by defendant himself. Under 
the circumstances the prosecution was entitled to correct this 
damaging impression by cross-examining its own witness and· 
by impeaching her with proof of her prior inconsistent state-
ments. 
Other contentions made by defendant are so entirely without 
merit that they need not be discussed. 
The judgment and order are affirmed. 
Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Traynor, J., and Spence, ,J., con-
curred. 
CARTER, J.-I dissent. 
It is here held by the majority that the State may impeach 
its own witness by another witness on the basis of a claimed 
prior eontradictory statement, even though the answer of the 
impeaching witness was not damaging or adverse to the 
prosecution. That result is reached by a process of reasoning 
that otherwise the state could be accused of harassing defendant 
by asking questions about prior contradictory statements 
without any basis-without showing that such statements had 
been made. This is directly contrary to People v. Newson, 
37 Cal.2c1 34 [230 P.2d 618], and other decisions of the court 
and the District Court of Appeal. The rule is thus stated in 
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the Newson case: " ... [T]he prior statements inconsistent 
with the witness' present testimony can only be considered 
for the purpose of neutralizing and counteracting the effect 
of his statements ttpon the trial. The purpose of the statute 
is to allow a party to wipe out, as nearly as possible, the evi-
dence which has been given. Where a witness states no fact 
aga?>nst the party calling him, there is nothing to counteract. 
The testimony which may be contradicted must be prejudicial 
and detrimental, otherwise the previous statement shown would 
stand out, not as offsetting contrary test]mony already given, 
but as substantive evidence of a fact." (Emphasis added.) 
In this case the ''no'' answer to the inquiry of whether 
defendant had told the witness, Nancy Teeples, that he was a 
narcotic addict, was in no way damaging or adverse to the 
State or beneficial to the defendant. No "fact against" the 
State was stated by the witness. Hence there was nothing 
to ''counteract.'' Indeed, the prior statement, claimed to 
be contradictory, would "stand out, not as contradictory testi-
mony already given, but as substantive evidence of the fact," 
which, of course, is not proper. 
The majority opinion seeks to escape the holding in the 
.Newson case, supra, by stating that the State had the right 
to counteract the impression that it was harassing defendant 
when it asked him whether he had made such a statement 
to the witness. Thus the State is permitted to lift itself by 
its own bootstraps. It is permitted, by the device of first 
putting the question to the defendant, to make the evidence 
of the impeaching witness stand out as substantive evidence. 
The effect is that little is left of the Newson case rule because 
it may easily be avoided by the prosecution by the simple 
method here used. Moreover, the State will always be able 
to claim that it is prejudiced in 1 he eyes of the jury because 
it has called a witness who does not testify as expected, thus 
indicating bad faith on its part. If it may "counteract" that 
effect by calling the impeaching witness, then there is nothing 
left of the Newson case rule. Under that rule, as appears £rom 
the foregoing quotation, the only thing the person calling the 
witness may counteract is the testimony of the witness which 
damages him. He cannot "counteract" an unfavorable im-
pression that may be made when such impression does not 
come £rom the witness sought to be impeached. 
In People v. Mitchell, 94 Cal. 550 [29 P. 1106], it was held 
error to impeach a witness by former testimony where on the 
stand he said he had not said a certain thing. The court said 
June 1952] PEOPLE v. LEBEAU 
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(p. 556): "A. witness, whichever party calls him, cannot be 
impeached unless he has given testimony against the impeach-
ing party. 'I'his witness had not testified against the prosecu-
tion. He simply failed to testify to a fact which the district 
attorney thought he could prove by him. . . . The impeaching 
statements were evidently desired as evidence. If such testi-
mony were admissible, it would be easy to mam4acture evi-
dence of that kincl. If a witness merely fails to testify as 
expected, that does not authorize the party calling him to 
prove that the witness had elsewhere made the desired state-
ments. It is only when he has given damaging testimony 
that he can be impeached." (Emphasis added.) In People 
v. Creeks, 141 Cal. 529 [75 P. 101], the facts were closely 
analogous. A. witness for the prosecution, defendant's mother, 
did not live up to the prosecution's expectations and said 
she did not know what shoes defendant was wearing on the 
day of the crime (a vital matter as footprints were involved). 
It was held error to permit her impeachment by her testimony 
at the preliminary hearing that the shoes in question were 
worn. She had been asked if she had made such contradictory 
stat~ments exactly the same as in the instant case. The court 
said (p. 531): "The evidence (given at the preliminary) 
was incompetent for any p1trpose . ... The testimony was 
sought to be elicited solely for the purpose of getting before 
the jury statements made by the mother in a prior occasion, 
tending to make out the case of the people. Where a witness 
called by a party has simply failed to testify to all that party 
expected or desired, but has not given testimony against him, 
it is not permissible for the party calling him to prove that 
such witness had previously made statements which if sworn 
to at the trial, would tend to make out his case. As was said 
by Mr. Justice McKinstry in People v. Jacobs, -49 Cal. 384, 
'To admit the proof of such statement would enable the party 
to get the naked declaration of the witness before the jury 
as independent evidence.' That such testimony is not author-
ized by the provisions of sections 2049 and 2052 of the Code of 
Civil Procedure was squarely held in People v. DeWitt, 68 
Cal. 584, 588 [10 P. 212]. The decisions of this court uni-
formly hold such testimony objectionable. (See People v. 
Jacobs, 49 Cal. 384; People v. DeWitt, 68 Cal. 584, 588 [10 
P. 212]; People v. Wallace, 89 Cal. 158, 164 [26 P. 650]; 
People v. Mitchell, 94 Cal. 550, 566 [29 P. 1106]; In re Ken-
nedy, 104 Cal. 429, 431 [38 P. 93] ; People v. Conkling, 111 
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Cal. 616,624 [44 P. 314]; People v. Crespi, 115 Cal. 50,55 [46 
P.863].) 
"Upon this subject, this court has never gone further than 
to hold that where a witness called by a party has given 
damaging testimony against him-as, for instance, if the 
mother had here affirmatively testified that defendant did not 
wear the shoes when he left her home-the party calling him 
may show that the witness previously made statements in-
consistent with his present testimony, and this ruling is ap-
parently upon the theory that the party was surprised by the 
adverse testimony given by his own witness.'' (Emphasis 
added.) A similar situation was presented in People v. Slis-
covich, 193 Cal. 544, 553 [226 P. 611], and the court there 
said: ''·while it is true that under the provisions of section 
2049 of the Code of Civil Procedure a party producing a wit-
ness may show that the witness had made statements at other 
times inconsistent with the testimony as given upon the witness-
stand, still the privilege permitted by this section may not be 
invoked on every occasion. The purpose of the provisions 
of this section is to permit a party who has, in good faith, 
produced a witness upon the stand in the belief that the witness 
will give certain testimony in support of the party calling him 
to show that prior to being called to the witness-stand the 
witness made statements which, if admitted in evidence, would 
have been favorable to the party calling the witness. But 
to entitle a party to contradict his own witness by showing 
statements elsewhere made and contrary to those made upon 
the witness-stand, it must apz!ear not only that the party was 
surprised by the testimony of the witness, but that such testi-
mony was prejudicial to the case of the party calling the 
witness. Therefore, the mere failure of a witness to testify 
favorably fo:r the party calling him, unaccompanied by any 
testimony which would tend to the prejudice of the case of 
the party calling the witness, will not entitle such party to 
show that the witness has elsewhere made contrary statements 
concerning the facts sought to be elicited from him. The wit-
ness in the instant case not having testified to anything that 
was prejudicial to the defendant and the defendant's case, 
the defendant was not privileged to invoke the provisions of 
the code section last above referred to." (Emphasis added.) 
(To the same effect are In re Kennedy, 104 Cal. 429 [38 P. 93] ; 
People v. Crespi, 115 Cal. 50 [ 46 P. 863] ; People v. Cook, 
148 Cal. 334 [83 P. 43]; Estate of Dolbeer, 153 Cal. 652 [96 
P. 266, 15 .Ann.Cas. 207] .) 
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The majority opinion in the instant case cannot be recon-
ciled with any of those authorities. It does not cite or attempt 
to distinguish any of them except the Newson and Sliscovich 
cases which are clearly indistinguishable. 
It is clear that the ruling was prejudicial because the evi-
dence admitted painted defendant as a depraved person-a 
narcotic addict. On that basis alone the jury may well have 
found him guilty. 
I would, therefore, reverse the judgment. 
SCHAUER, J.-I concur in the reasoning and conclusion 
of Justice Carter. 
[L. A. No. 21983. In Bank. June 26, 1952.] 
MOLLIE SEXTON, Respondent, v. EVELYN SIMON 
BROOKS, Appellant. 
[1] Negligence-Instructions-Duties Toward Invitees.-Instruc-
tion that an invitor is under a duty to keep in a safe condi-
tion all portions of "premises over which he has control," 
whether they are within the building or on the outside and 
used by the general public as well as invitees as "an approach 
to the building," correctly states the law. 
[2] Streets-Injuries Caused by Defects-Liability of Abutting 
Owner.-General rule is that in absence of statute a land-
owner is under no duty to maintain in a safe condition a 
public street abutting upon his property. 
[3] !d.-Injuries Caused by Defects-Liability of Abutting Owner. · 
-An abutting owner is liable for condition of portions of 
public sidewalk which he has altered or constructed for 
benefit of his property and which serve a use independent 
of and apart from the ordinary and accustomed use for which 
sidewalks are designed. 
[2] Liability of abutting owner or occupant for condition of 
sidewalk, notes, 41 A.L.R. 212; 93 A.L.R. 799. See, also, Cal.Jur., 
Municipal Corporations, § 468; Am.Jur., Highways, § 364. 
[3] Liability of abutting owner or occupant for condition of 
part of private driveway which is within street, note, 59 A.L.R. 
441. Liability of owner or occupant for condition of covering 
over opening or vault in sidewalk, note, 62 A.L.R. 1067. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Negligence, § 192; [2-6] Streets, 
§ 74; [7, 8] Streets, § 91(3). 
